In a video, former U.S. Marine intelligence officer and UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter reminded viewers just how close the United States and Russia came to nuclear war under the Biden administration.
In 2024, Ritter argues, Russia was looking for a way out of the Ukraine conflict. Moscow was not committed to unconditional surrender; it was open to a negotiated settlement. But at the time, Russian openness to negotiations was interpreted by many in the West as a sign of weakness, and there was a great deal of effort to exploit that perceived weakness.
Ritter reminds us what happened in August 2024: NATO invaded Russia.
NATO sent some 70,000 to 80,000 NATO-trained and NATO-equipped Ukrainian troops into the Kursk region. This was not a minor incursion. According to Ritter, the operation was intended to seize territory and potentially a nuclear power plant, creating leverage for a possible exchange involving the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
This was a major operation planned with NATO involvement. It wasn’t simply a case of Ukrainian forces waking up one morning and deciding, “Let’s go into Kursk.” Ritter argues that the leadership of the United States, Britain, and France supported the operation.
The force itself consisted primarily of Ukrainian troops, backed by mercenaries, but these were handpicked units trained and equipped with specialized NATO equipment.
A lot of people also don’t realize that NATO changed its operational doctrine after the failure of Ukraine’s 2023 summer counteroffensive. The new approach incorporated an AI-driven concept of operational intelligence fusion. According to Ritter, Ukrainian tactical units were given iPad-like devices that directed them where to move based on intelligence about Russian force dispositions. The system could identify gaps, predict Russian response times, and select the routes offering the greatest opportunities. This enabled the Ukrainians to make significant advances into Russian territory.
It took considerable courage and skill on the Russian side to stop them. Airborne troops, Marines, and Chechen special forces were brought in. The Chechen forces disrupted the offensive, the Marines stopped the advance, and the paratroopers followed up. Gradually, Russian forces pushed the attackers back.
But this was, Ritter emphasizes, a NATO intervention.
And that’s important because of what happened next.
In September 2024, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer flew to Washington with his official documents briefcase. He had a meeting scheduled with President Biden on September 13, where he was expected to seek approval for Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike deep inside Russia.
This would have gone far beyond attacks on Russian positions in the Donbas or Crimea. It would have meant striking targets deep inside Russia’s strategic depth. The United States was also considering authorizing the use of ATACMS for similar purposes.
That mattered because Russia had made clear that if nuclear-armed states provided a non-nuclear state with the capability to strike deep into Russia’s strategic territory, Moscow could regard such attacks as an attack by those nuclear powers themselves—even if the weapons being used were conventional.
This was the context in which the Kursk invasion had taken place.
And this is where the story became personal for Ritter.
On September 13, the very day this meeting was scheduled to take place, he was at the Russian Embassy in Washington attending a concert. He had been meeting with Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov since late 2022 to discuss Russophobia and ways of exposing American audiences to Russian culture. One of the things they discussed was organizing cultural events, including concerts.
That evening there was a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov. Ritter says he doesn’t normally like classical music—he’s more of a Bruce Springsteen and Bob Dylan kind of guy—but it was a great honor for him to be invited, and he attended out of respect for the ambassador and the effort he had put into organizing the event.
But that night, Anatoly Antonov was not the same man Ritter had known. He was ashen-faced. Something had clearly shocked him. He cut the concert short and left.
It turned out that earlier that afternoon, Antonov had made a phone call.
According to Ritter, people close to the White House had wanted to know whether the Russians were bluffing about their willingness to use nuclear weapons. According to people whom Ritter says were in a position to know—though he stresses that Antonov himself has never discussed this with him directly—the ambassador was contacted and asked about the Russian response if ATACMS or Storm Shadow missiles were used against targets deep inside Russia.
The answer, as it was relayed to Ritter, was unequivocal: Russia would respond, and Washington, D.C., would be on the target list.
There would be no ambiguity about it.
According to this account, that warning contributed to Biden not signing the authorization. He reportedly became furious, and Starmer left Washington upset. The United States then conducted a review of whether Russia was bluffing.
That became the central question: Were the Russians bluffing?
Because no president likes to be publicly constrained by a Russian nuclear threat.
In November 2024, Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, the J5 Director of Plans at U.S. Strategic Command, was speaking at CSIS. During the question-and-answer session, he was asked essentially that question: Were the Russians bluffing? Was the United States prepared for a nuclear conflict?
His answer was roughly this: The United States was prepared to have a nuclear exchange with Russia—and believed it would win.
Let me put that more simply, Ritter says.
He was saying that the United States was prepared to fight a nuclear war with Russia and believed it could win.
Why is that significant?
Because in February 2022, the Biden administration had joined the other nuclear-weapon states recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty in reaffirming the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
That was the official policy line.
Yet by November 2024, we had the J5 saying that the United States was prepared for a nuclear war with Russia and believed it could win.
And then he qualified what “winning” actually meant.
It didn’t mean what most people imagine. Winning a nuclear war would mean the destruction of America as we know it. The United States would no longer exist as a constitutional republic. There would be very few survivors, and those survivors would live under a strict government-imposed survival regime.
In other words, to save America through nuclear war would be to destroy America.
He reportedly said that perhaps the American people needed to understand what “winning” actually meant, because otherwise they might become far too enthusiastic about nuclear war.
After that, Ritter went to Congress and spoke with very senior members of Congress from both parties. He specifically asked whether the CIA believed Russia was bluffing about nuclear weapons, because that was the argument being made publicly in some major American newspapers.
The answer he received from a very senior Democrat, and independently echoed by a very senior Republican, was no.
The CIA did not believe Russia was bluffing.
The assessment, as it was described to Ritter, was that Russia would use nuclear weapons if it believed its strategic territory was under a sufficiently serious attack.
But there was something even more frightening.
According to the congressional briefing described to Ritter, the assessment was that there was more than a 50 percent chance of a nuclear war with Russia by the end of 2024.
Think about that.
The United States was apparently assessing that Russia might actually use nuclear weapons because of the escalation surrounding Ukraine, including the prospect of attacks deep inside Russian territory.
And yet people today seem to have forgotten what happened in Kursk.
They have forgotten that Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory in a major offensive involving tens of thousands of troops, with extensive NATO training, equipment, intelligence, and operational support.
They have forgotten how close the subsequent escalation over long-range strikes came to triggering a direct confrontation between nuclear powers.
But according to Ritter, the danger did not end with the Biden administration.
The Valdai Incident
Ritter points to another episode that he considers particularly revealing.
In December 2025, while President Trump was speaking by telephone with Vladimir Putin about the Alaska peace initiative, Ritter says that 98 Ukrainian drones, allegedly guided by CIA intelligence, were heading toward Putin’s residence at Valdai.
Ritter says that Trump kept Putin on the phone while he temporarily stepped away, as the drones were approaching the Russian president’s residence.
“You can call it what you want,” Ritter says. In his view, it was either an assassination attempt or, at the very least, an effort to put pressure on and intimidate Putin.
The claim is presented by Ritter as part of a broader pattern of escalation. He points to the June 2025 Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb, in which Ukrainian intelligence, with assistance from the CIA and MI6, launched drones from trucks against Russian strategic bombers.
For Ritter, that was another major red line: a direct assault on Russia’s strategic nuclear bomber force.
His conclusion is that the Trump administration’s public claims that it was trying to de-escalate the conflict did not match what was happening on the ground.
The Strategy Behind the War
Ritter argues that the United States has been pursuing a strategy aimed at creating what he calls a “Moscow Maidan moment.”
The objective, in his view, is to defeat Russia not necessarily through a conventional military victory, but by collapsing its economy, exhausting its military, and breaking the population’s will to continue fighting—ultimately producing unrest on the streets and bringing down the Putin government.
Putin, Ritter argues, has now recognized this strategy.
Russia understands, in his view, that the United States is not genuinely pursuing a peace process and that Washington’s ultimate objective is regime change in Moscow.
That is why, Ritter says, the Russian debate has changed.
The question is no longer whether Russia is bluffing about nuclear weapons. The question increasingly being asked in Russia is whether NATO is actually capable of doing anything to change the outcome of the war.
Ritter points to Fyodor Lukyanov, whom he describes as part of Russia’s liberal, traditionally pro-Western elite and someone who had previously been open to a negotiated settlement. Yet even Lukyanov, Ritter says, has increasingly concluded that Russia may have to win the war on its own terms.
From the Russian perspective, Ritter argues, much of the Western posturing is ultimately irrelevant. Europe can announce new military programs, discuss nuclear cooperation and long-range strike capabilities, and threaten further escalation—but Moscow can simply wait.
Ritter sees Europe as politically and economically weakened, while he considers NATO increasingly incapable of sustaining a meaningful confrontation with Russia.
The biggest variable, he argues, is Donald Trump.
Ritter describes Trump as emotionally unpredictable and says that Moscow therefore has to manage him carefully—a dangerous but manageable actor, in his view.
But Ritter’s greatest concern is no longer Europe.
It is Asia.
The Greater Nuclear Danger May Be in Asia
Ritter argues that there is a huge danger of nuclear escalation in the Pacific that receives far less attention than the war in Europe.
He points to North Korea’s expanding military cooperation with Russia, the deployment of North Korean troops, and what he describes as North Korea gaining firsthand experience of modern warfare.
He is particularly concerned about the development of heavier North Korean missiles and larger warheads.
Then there is Taiwan.
What happens, Ritter asks, if tensions between China and Japan escalate? What if Japan attacks a Chinese coast guard vessel and China retaliates against Japan? What happens if Taiwan becomes involved and China attacks the island? And what would the United States do?
That, Ritter argues, is where the real nuclear danger lies.
Ukraine, by contrast, is no longer the same strategic problem it was in 2024. Russia has adapted, its military has matured, and the Kursk offensive is over. According to Ritter, Russia no longer views NATO as a credible military threat capable of changing the fundamental balance of the war.
The War on the Battlefield
Ritter also argues that the nature of warfare itself has changed dramatically because of drones.
In the past, a collapse of Ukrainian defenses might have produced the kind of classic military advance represented by large arrows on a map—encirclements, breakthroughs and rapid advances deep into the enemy’s rear.
That is much harder today.
Even if a front collapses, Ukraine can concentrate thousands of FPV drones in a particular area. Any large formation attempting to exploit a breakthrough can therefore become extremely vulnerable.
Ritter says that this is why Russia is not pursuing spectacular breakthroughs. Instead, it is advancing slowly and methodically, dominating the Ukrainians tactically, operationally and strategically while steadily wearing down their forces.
During a visit to Russia, Ritter says he spoke with Russian military personnel about drone warfare. Initially, he was told that the situation was becoming extremely difficult. By April and May, the Russians warned him that some areas had become so dangerous that they might have to cancel his planned visit.
When he eventually traveled through the conflict zone, he says, drones were a constant presence.
But he saw no panic among the Russian forces.
Their message was essentially: It’s difficult, but we know what the Ukrainians are doing, we’re developing ways to counter it, and we have it under control.
Ritter argues that Russia has since moved from merely containing the Ukrainian drone threat to gaining the upper hand.
Ukrainian drones are still reaching Russian targets, he acknowledges, but he says their effectiveness has declined and Ukraine is increasingly struggling to replace experienced drone operators.
The Economic War
Ritter argues that Russia’s ultimate objective is not simply to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield.
It is to destroy Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war.
He maintains that Russia is increasingly targeting Ukraine’s defense-industrial infrastructure and economic capacity, including facilities that have been dispersed into civilian environments.
He claims that Ukrainian drone production has been moved into civilian locations, including shopping centers and apartment buildings, and argues that this has made such facilities potential military targets.
Whatever one makes of that argument, it forms an important part of Ritter’s explanation for the continuing Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.
He believes Russia is gradually dismantling Ukraine’s military-industrial base rather than attempting to achieve a single dramatic breakthrough.
Why Russia Does Not Want a War with NATO
Ritter’s argument is also that Russia has no interest in attacking NATO.
Indeed, he believes the opposite is true: some European policymakers may see a Russian attack on NATO as the only development capable of restoring cohesion within the alliance and bringing the United States fully back into the European conflict.
A Russian attack on NATO, in that logic, could give the alliance a renewed sense of purpose and potentially force Washington to re-engage.
But Russia has no reason to give NATO that opportunity.
Ritter therefore rejects calls for Russia to attack Europe.
Anyone advocating such a course, he argues, is not acting in Russia’s interests.
Instead, Russia’s strategy is to defeat Ukraine while avoiding a direct war with NATO.
The Danger of Nuclear War
Ritter ultimately returns to the nuclear question.
He stresses that his assessment that the danger of a nuclear war in Europe is lower than the danger in Asia should not be interpreted as saying that Europe is safe.
The danger remains serious.
There is, Ritter argues, no such thing as a genuinely “limited” nuclear war.
He points to the old Cold War principle: nuclear wars cannot be won and therefore must never be fought.
The moment one nuclear power concludes that nuclear weapons can be used to achieve military objectives and that a nuclear war can somehow be won, the entire logic of strategic deterrence begins to unravel.
Other nuclear powers would then have to respond to restore the balance.
That is why Ritter considers talk about the controlled use of tactical nuclear weapons so dangerous. In his view, every serious war game involving tactical nuclear weapons has ultimately escalated into a general nuclear exchange.
The lesson of the Cold War, he argues, was precisely the opposite.
Ronald Reagan was one of the most uncompromising anti-communists in American history, yet he ultimately understood the necessity not merely of arms control but of arms reduction. Ritter considers the INF Treaty a landmark achievement that helped save Europe and the world from nuclear catastrophe.
Today, he argues, that understanding is being lost.
Europe is not discussing how to reduce the nuclear danger. It is discussing how to push the nuclear threshold closer to Russia.
And that, Ritter warns, is precisely the kind of thinking that could turn a conventional conflict into a catastrophe.
The central lesson of his argument is therefore stark:
There is no winning a nuclear war. The only way to win one is not to fight it.
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strategy but
Congratulations to the only winner from Ukraine!
His trophy, the immense wealth he had acquired by dubious means, found a safe haven.
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Felix Abt is an entrepreneur, author and travel blogger, living in Asia.
With his articles, he tries to make a modest contribution to debunking the omnipresent propaganda of the mainstream media for those who don’t have the time (and that’s most people) to do the research to see through it.
Excellent. It is important to recall such facts. Piece translated in French here : https://zanzibar.substack.com/p/au-cas-ou-vous-lauriez-manque-lotan